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Abstract—Recent progress in machine learning has generated
promising results in behavioral malware detection. Behavioral
modeling identifies malicious processes via features derived by
their runtime behavior. Behavioral features hold great promise as
they are intrinsically related to the functioning of each malware,
and are therefore considered difficult to evade. Indeed, while a
significant amount of results exists on evasion of static malware
features, evasion of dynamic features has seen limited work.
This paper thoroughly examines the robustness of behavioral
malware detectors to evasion, focusing particularly on anti-
ransomware evasion. We choose ransomware as its behavior tends
to differ significantly from that of benign processes, making
it a low-hanging fruit for behavioral detection (and a difficult
candidate for evasion). Our analysis identifies a set of novel
attacks that distribute the overall malware workload across
a small set of cooperating processes to avoid the generation
of significant behavioral features. Our most effective attack
decreases the accuracy of a state-of-the-art classifier from 98.6%
to 0% using only 18 cooperating processes. Furthermore, we
show our attacks to be effective against commercial ransomware
detectors even in a black-box setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of automatic malware detection is a difficult
one, with no full solution in sight despite decades of research.
The traditional approach—based on analysis of static signa-
tures of the malware binary (e.g., hashes)—is increasingly
rendered ineffective by polymorphism and the widespread
availability of program obfuscation tools [1], [2]. Using such
tools, malware creators can quickly generate thousands of
binary variants of functionally identical samples, effectively
circumventing signature-based approaches.
As a result, in recent years the focus of the community has
increasingly shifted towards dynamic, behavior-based analysis
techniques. Behavioral approaches sidestep the challenges
of obfuscated binary analysis. Instead, they focus on the
runtime behavior of malware processes, which is difficult
to alter without breaking core functionality, and is therefore
considered a reliable fingerprint for malware presence. This
strong push towards malware behavioral analysis, coupled with
the recent improvements in the field of Machine Learning
(ML), has resulted in a multitude of ML-based behavioral
approaches to malware detection. Popular techniques range
from modeling of system call sequences [3] to full-fledged,
fine-grained modeling of process behavior [4], [5]. At first
sight, the ML-based approach appears to hold great promise:
ML applications to cybersecurity have been successful in many
fields, and malware detection is no exception. In general, the
behavior of malware differs significantly from that of benign
processes, and ML techniques allow to differentiate between
them with extremely high accuracy. Moreover, ML-based
approaches are also able to correctly classify unseen malware
samples, as long as they are trained on an appropriate training
set and the new samples exhibit some form of anomalous
behavior with respect to benign processes.
Despite the incredible success of ML, a growing body of
work has cast a shadow over its robustness in adversarial
settings. Research has shown that ML classifiers in a wide
range of security applications are vulnerable to attacks, such
as adversarial examples [6] and evasion [7]. Our work as-
sesses the robustness of recently-proposed ML applications to
behavioral ransomware detection [4], [5]. We use ransomware
as case study due to both the gravity of the threat (e.g., [8],
[9]), and the fact that—given its highly distinctive behavioral
profile—ransomware is a nearly ideal target for ML-based
detection. Our results show that it is possible to craft
ransomware that accomplishes the goal of encrypting all
user files, and at the same time avoids generating any
significant behavioral features. Our newly-discovered attacks
have fairly low implementation complexity, do not limit ran-
somware functionality in any significant way, and were found
to be effective against a set of academic and commercial anti-
ransomware solutions. Moreover, our attacks are successful
even in a black-box setting, with no prior knowledge of the
the model internals, its training data, or the features used by
the ML model. The core of our approach is an algorithm
that cleverly distributes the desired set of malware operations
across a small set of cooperating processes1. While our work
1In Isaac Asimov’s 1957 science fiction novel The Naked Sun, a crime is
committed by a group of robots. Each robot performs an apparently innocuous
action that complies with the First Law of Robotics (A robot may not injure
a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm),
however the combination of such actions results in murder.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
02
42
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 N
ov
 20
19
has focused on obfuscating ransomware-related features, the
underlying principles are general and likely to apply to a wide
range of ML detectors that analyze the runtime behavior of
different types of malware.
Our contributions:
• We perform a comprehensive analysis of characteristic
features typically used to detect ransomware, and define
techniques and criteria for evasion.
• We assess the robustness of current state-of-the-art behav-
ioral ransomware detectors, showing how it is possible
to design ransomware that completely evades detection.
In particular, we propose three novel evasion techniques:
process splitting, functional splitting, and mimicry.
• We implement and evaluate Cerberus, a proof-of-concept
prototype of a ransomware following our approach, prov-
ing that our evasion technique is practical.
• We evaluate our novel evasion techniques against multiple
state-of-the-art ML detectors, as well as against a leading
commercial behavioral detector. Results show that our
techniques are effective and successfully evade detection,
even in a black-box setting.
• We evaluate the dependence of our attack on the dataset
used. Results show that our evasion techniques are effec-
tive even without access to the dataset used to train the
target classifiers.
• We discuss the applicability of our evasion techniques to
other types of malware, and potential countermeasures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II provides background on adversarial ML and ran-
somware detection. Section III describes our novel evasion
techniques. Section IV analyzes features used for ransomware
detection, and discusses general principles for evading detec-
tion. Section V describes a proof-of-concept ransomware im-
plementing our approach, while Section VI evaluates it against
a suite of state-of-the-art detection techniques. Section VII
discuss applications of our techniques beyond ransomware,
and possible countermeasures. Section VIII reviews related
work, Section IX discusses the ethical implications of our
work, and Section X concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Adversarial ML
The core problem of adversarial ML can be stated in
a simplified form as follows. Consider a multi-dimensional
feature space V , where a vector v ∈ V may represent
properties (features) of an underlying object of interest o. For
example, a process may be represented by a vector encoding
the frequencies of certain system calls. Furthermore, consider
a classification function f : V → C mapping vectors in V to
classes in a given set C = c1, ..., cn. Typically the goal of an
adversarial ML attack is to cause f to misclassify one or more
feature vectors, i.e. forcing the classifier to make mistakes in
mapping objects to labels. Many classifiers used in security
distinguish between a benign and a malicious object class,
i.e., C = {B,M}. In this settings, the problem therefore
becomes—given a vector v belonging to class M—to cause
f(v) = B. One way to “trick” f is to alter its training dataset,
causing it to learn an incorrect boundary between classes. This
constitutes a poisoning attack [10]. Conversely, adversarial
sample generation consists in picking a victim classifier which
has been trained on a correctly-labeled dataset, and crafting
one or more malicious objects in such a way that they get
classified as benign. In our work we focus on the latter attack.
The literature proposes several techniques to generate ad-
versarial feature vectors directly from a formal representa-
tion of a target classifier (e.g., [11], [12]). These techniques
typically are agnostic to the type of object being studied,
and work purely in feature space. There is then a second
line of work which investigates the complementary problem,
given a successful adversarial feature vector, to generate a
corresponding object (e.g., given the feature vector that a
stealth malware should exhibit not to be detected, generate
the actual binary of the malware). Past work demonstrates use
of adversarial ML to generate stealth PDF exploits [7], [13],
[14], Android malware [15]–[17], Flash malware [18], and
a variety of other dangerous objects. Our work falls within
the realm of adversarial sample generation. In the rest of this
paper, we demonstrate (i) heuristics to generate adversarial
feature vectors for ransomware behavior, and (ii) a proof-of-
concept ransomware prototype whose behavior generates the
target adversarial feature values.
B. Behavioral Ransomware Detection
The literature presents several recent works on ransomware
detection based on behavioral features [4], [5], [19]–[21]. UN-
VEIL [20] and its successor Redemption [19] detect suspicious
activity by computing a score using an heuristic function
over various behavioral features: file entropy changes, writes
that cover extended portions of a file, file deletion, processes
writing to a large number of user files, processes writing
to files of different types, back-to-back writes. Similarly,
CryptoDrop [21] maintains a “reputation score”—indicating
the trustworthiness of a process—computed based on three
main indicators: file type changes, similarity between original
and written content, and entropy measurement. Additionally,
CryptoDrop also uses deletion and file type funneling (read-
ing/writing a small set of file types) as secondary indicators.
Our attack is motivated by a review of all the approaches
cited above; for evaluation however we selected two of them,
which are described in greater detail in the following. The se-
lection was based on practical considerations: both approaches
were published in highly visible venues, and in both cases the
authors kindly provided enough material (code and/or datasets)
and support to enable us to run their software. Our evaluation
also includes a commercial product from [anonymized] (dis-
cussed at the end of this section).
1) ShieldFS: ShieldFS [4] is a technique for identifying
ransomware processes at file-system level and transparently
roll back file changes performed by processes deemed ma-
licious. Ransomware detection is based on ML models of
well- and ill-behaved processes. Detection is performed at the
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Fig. 1: Incremental models in ShieldFS (reproduced from [4])
process level by using a hierarchy of random forest classifiers
tuned at different temporal resolutions. Using different tempo-
ral resolutions allows ShieldFS to take into account both short-
and long-term process history when performing classification,
which is crucial to detect code injection-based ransomware.
ShieldFS uses features typically associated with ransomware
operation for the classifier, such as #folder-listing operations,
#read operations, #write operations, #rename operations, per-
centage of file accessed among all those with same extension
and average entropy of data passed to write operations.
ShieldFS divides the lifetime of each process in up to 28
ticks; ticks do not represent fixed interval of times; instead,
they define fractions of the overall set of files accessed by
a process. Ticks are exponentially spaced; the first tick is
reached when a process has accessed 0.1% of the files on
the filesystem; the last when a process has accessed 100%
of the files. Whenever a certain tick i is reached, ShieldFS
computes the features over multiple intervals. The first interval
covers operations between ticks i − 1 and i. Each of the
remaining intervals ends at tick i and begins further in the
past compared to the previous one. Features computed over
each interval are fed to a dedicated model for classification.
Figure 1 (reproduced from [4]) shows the first six ticks in
the lifetime of a process, and the various intervals covered by
each model. A process is considered malicious if positively
detected for K = 3 consecutive ticks.
ShieldFS also employs a system-wide classifier that com-
putes and classifies feature values across all processes in the
system. This classifier is however only used to disambiguate
ambiguous results from per-process classifiers. In other words,
if a per-process model over a certain interval cannot determine
whether the process is malicious or not, system-wide features
are computed over the same interval and fed to the system-
wide classifier. When our attack is successful, individual
processes are always classified as benign with high confidence
and therefore the system-wide classifier is never triggered.
2) RWGuard: RWGuard [5], by Mehnaz et al., is a ran-
somware detector which leverages multiple techniques: pro-
cess behavior, suspicious file changes, use of OS encryption
libraries, and changes to decoy files. We do not discuss
decoy and library-based detection as it is orthogonal to our
work. Compared to ShieldFS, RWGuard uses a relatively
simple detector consisting of a random forest classifier that
analyzes process behavior using a 3 seconds sliding window.
The features used by the classifier include the number of
various low-level disk operations performed by each process
under analysis. The behavioral classifier is complemented by
a file monitor component which computes four metrics after
each write operation: a similarity score based on similarity-
preserving hashing, size difference, file type change and file
entropy. Significant changes in any of first three metrics and/or
high file entropy are interpreted as a sign of ransomware
activity.
The detection process of RWGuard consists of three steps:
when the behavioral classifier detects a suspicious process
activity, the file monitor component is invoked to validate
the initial detection. If both modules agree that the activity
is suspicious, a third module, the File Classification module,
is invoked to assess if the encryption operation is benign
or malicious. Only after all three modules agree on the
maliciousness of the suspicion activity, then the responsible
process is considered malicious. When our attack is successful,
individual processes are classified as benign by the behavioral
module, and the remaining modules are not invoked.
3) [anonymized]: Several commercial anti-ransomware
solutions exist; for our work, we chose to evaluate
[anonymized]. [anonymized] does not provide details on
the inner workings of their product; the company however
states that their product leverages machine learning. These
indications suggest some type of behavioral classifier. For our
evaluation, we use version [version].
III. EVADING ML DETECTORS
A. Process Splitting
Behavioral classifiers are designed to use features that are
considered inextricably linked with malicious behavior and
generally not present in benign applications. Our approach
is based on the insight that behavioral detectors collect these
features on a per-process basis to model the behavior of a given
application. For instance, ransomware detectors profile pro-
cesses based on features such as entropy of write operations or
number of read/write/directory listing operations. We exploit
this limitation by devising a novel evasion technique based on
distributing the malware operations across multiple indepen-
dent processes: each process individually appears to have a
benign behavior. However, the aggregated action of all these
processes results in the intended malicious malware behavior.
It is important to note that this is not just a limitation of current
behavioral classifiers, but it is rather an inherent restriction of
process behavioral modeling, as there is no straightforward
way to identify a set of processes working independently
to achieve a common final goal. However, coordinating N
processes requires communication among them, which could
be used to identify the set of cooperating processes. To
avoid this, covert communication techniques can be used.
Section V discusses inter-process communication and how
it is currently implemented in our prototype. The remainder
of this section describes our three proposed approaches to
evade classification, in increasing order of complexity: process
splitting, functional splitting and mimicry.
Process Splitting is the simplest and most straightforward
multi-process ransomware evasion approach. In process split-
ting, the ransomware behavior is distributed over N processes,
each performing 1/N of the total ransomware operations.
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Fig. 2: Process and functional splitting attacks
Effectively, this approach implements a form of data paral-
lelism: each individual process performs all the ransomware
operations on a subset of the user files. The intuition is
that ransomware classifiers are trained on traditional, single-
process ransomware, which exhibits extremely high number of
operations such as directory listing, read and write. Splitting
the ransomware over N independent processes allows to
reduce the number of such operations performed by each
individual processes, since each process only encrypts a subset
of all files. If we split the original ransomware enough
times, the number of operations performed by each individual
process-split ransomware process becomes low enough that
the classifier is unable to detect the ransomware.
While this technique is simple, our experiments show it can
be extremely effective even against complex classifiers (see
Section VI). Moreover, the approach can be easily tailored
against specific ML models by following a simple process
splitting procedure, as illustrated in Figure 2(b). Given a
trained classifier we want to evade, we run our ransomware and
query the model to check if it is detected. If the ransomware
is detected, we further split its operations and query the model
again. We continue splitting the ransomware operations over
an increasing number of processes and querying the classifier
until the desired evasion rate is achieved.
B. Functional Splitting
While process splitting is very effective in reducing the ac-
curacy of ransomware classifiers, completely evading detection
can be challenging. Indeed, depending on the robustness of
the target classifier, process splitting might require creating a
very large number of processes. This process explosion may
be used to detect the presence of ransomware.
A more well-rounded approach to classifier evasion is
Functional Splitting, as illustrated in Figure 2(c). Ransomware
processes perform a set of operations (or functions) to encrypt
user files, such as reading, writing or directory listing. When
using functional splitting, we separate each of these ran-
somware functions in a process group: each process within the
group (called functional split ransomware process) performs
only that specific ransomware function. Within each group, we
can further apply the process splitting technique to reduce the
number of the specific operation performed by an individual
functional split ransomware process. The intuition behind
the functional splitting approach is that ML classifiers use
groups of features to classify processes. If a process only
exhibits a small subset of the features that the model associates
to ransomware, then it will not be classified as malicious.
Functional splitting takes this concept to the extreme, having
each functional split ransomware process only exhibit a single
ransomware feature.
C. Mimicry
Functional splitting is extremely effective against current
state-of-the-art ransomware classifiers. Moreover, it does not
suffer from the process explosion issue that affects process
splitting. However, it could be feasible to train an ML model
to recognize this particular evasion attack. Typical benign pro-
cesses perform several different types of functions, therefore
an ML model could be trained to differentiate between benign
processes and functional split ransomware processes.
To avoid this potential drawback, we propose a third evasion
attack: Mimicry. Rather than splitting ransomware processes
into individual functional groups, each ransomware process is
designed to have the same functional behavior as a benign
process, effectively making it indistinguishable from other be-
nign applications. The intuition behind the mimicry approach
is that behavioral ML models classify samples based on the
expression of a given set of features. Ransomware processes
exhibit some characteristic features, while different benign
applications exhibit different sets of features to different
degrees. By splitting ransomware into multiple processes—and
having each individual process exhibit only features displayed
by benign processes—it becomes impossible for a classifier
to distinguish between the runtime behavior of mimicry ran-
somware processes and benign processes. Effectively, mimicry
ransomware processes are modeled after benign processes and
exhibit only features that benign processes exhibit. Moreover,
the degree to which each feature is exhibited by each mimicry
process (e.g., how many read/write operations are performed)
is kept consistent with that of benign processes.
The end result of the mimicry approach are ransomware
processes that act exactly like benign processes. However,
the collective behavior of all the mimicry processes results
in the desired malicious end goal. Section IV discusses which
features are characteristic of ransomware processes, and how
we can limit the occurrence of each of these features in order
to mimic the behavior of benign processes.
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IV. FEATURES DISCUSSION
Behavioral classifiers exploit the marked behavioral dif-
ferences between benign programs and malware in order to
detect malicious samples. In the context of ransomware, such
classifiers rely on a wide range of features that all ransomware
programs must exhibit in order to reach their goal. This section
discusses these features and analyze their robustness to eva-
sion. Many of the features described here are also displayed by
benign processes, and each feature by itself does not provide
strong evidence for or against ransomware behavior. However,
when considered together, these features highlight a very
unique program behavior proper of ransomware processes.
A. Write Entropy
The end goal of ransomware is to encrypt users’ files and
collect a ransom payment in exchange for the decryption
key. Typical encrypted data is a pseudorandom string with no
structure, and exhibits maximum entropy [5], while structured
data written by benign programs is assumed to have consider-
ably lower entropy. Consequently, entropy of write operations
appears to be a useful feature to differentiate ransomware from
benign processes. In fact all state-of-the-art ML ransomware
detectors use entropy of write operations as a feature, in one
form or another [4], [5], [19], [22].
1) Evasion: Entropy as a feature for ransomware detection
can be used at different levels of granularity: (1) overall file
entropy [5], (2) average read-write operations difference [19],
[22], and (3) individual write operations [4]. Feature (1) does
not allow accurate differentiation between ransomware and
benign processes, as nowadays
most common file types are compressed for efficiency,
including file types generally targeted by ransomware such
as pdf, docx, xlsx, video and image files. Consequently, the
overall file entropy for this file types, as measured by current
state-of-the-art approaches relying on Shannon entropy [23],
is comparable to that of an encrypted file. For what concerns
feature (2), in our research we analyzed several file types with
their associated programs, and found out that in general benign
processes working on compressed formats exhibit numerous
very high entropy read and write operations.
It is worth pointing out, however, that despite the considera-
tions above our dataset also shows a non-negligible difference
in the average entropy of individual file write operations.
Such averages are 0.4825 for benign processes vs 0.88 for
ransomware, with range [0−1]. Despite this somewhat counter-
intuitive result, it is still straightforward to evade feature (3).
Average write entropy can be skewed simply by introducing
artificial, low-entropy write operations that lower the average
write entropy for a ransomware process, bringing it in line
with that of benign processes.
B. File Overwrite
Different ransomware families use different techniques to
encrypt user files. However, one feature that is common
across ransomware families is that the original file is fully
overwritten, either with the encrypted data or with random
data to perform a secure delete [22]. On the other hand, benign
processes rarely overwrite user files completely. Therefore, file
overwrite is a valuable feature that can be exploited to classify
between ransomware and benign processes.
1) Evasion: In order to evade this feature, we need to limit
the percentage of a file overwritten by a single ransomware
process. Maintaining this percentage within the range exhib-
ited by benign processes can be easily achieved with our
proposed multi-process ransomware approach. It is sufficient
to distribute write operations to a given file over multiple ran-
somware processes, each of which only overwrites a portion of
the file. Each individual process does not show any suspicious
behavior, but the aggregated action of all the processes still
overwrites the whole file.
C. Directory Traversal
In order to maximize the amount of damage for the vic-
tim, ransomware typically encrypts every file in any given
user directory. Therefore, ransomware processes issue open
operations for every file in a directory. This behavior is fairly
distinctive and not common in benign processes, except for
some particular cases. Therefore, when coupled with other
meaningful features, directory traversal can serve as a useful
indicator to detect a ransomware process.
1) Evasion: The directory traversal feature can be easily
evaded using our multi-process ransomware approach. Indeed,
by setting an upper bound on the number of files each
ransomware process can access in a given directory, we can
heavily reduce the expression of this feature.
D. Directory Listing
In order to encrypt user files, ransomware first need to
discover all files of interest. In order to perform file discovery,
ransomware issue a very large amount of file listing operations.
While some types of benign processes also exhibit similar
behavior (e.g., Windows Explorer), this feature can be a
valuable indicator of ransomware activity when coupled with
other meaningful features.
1) Evasion: The directory listing feature can be easily
evaded using our multi-process ransomware approach. Indeed,
having multiple processes allows us to distribute the listing
operations and therefore limit the incidence of this feature for
each individual process.
E. Cross-File Type Access
Typically, benign processes only access a fixed subset of
file types (e.g., a pdf viewer will access pdf files, but not
docx). On the other hand, a ransomware process will access
all important user files, regardless of the coherence of their
file types, in order to encrypt them (e.g., pdf, xlsx, jpeg). This
cross-file type access behavior can therefore serve as a useful
feature to detect ransomware operations when coupled with
other meaningful features.
1) Evasion: Cross-file type access can be evaded in a
similar fashion to the directory traversal feature. It is sufficient
to separate ransomware processes into different groups, and
have each process in a group access only a coherent subset
of file types. This is enough to make a ransomware process
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indistinguishable from benign processes from the point of view
of file type access.
F. Read/Write/Open/Create/Close Operations
Ransomware accesses and encrypts as many files as possible
on the victim’s directories to maximize the damage and
ensure the payment of a ransom. This behavior results in an
abnormally large amount of file operations such as read, write,
open, close and, for some ransomware families, create. Typical
benign processes rarely access so many files in a single run,
except for some particular cases (e.g., files indexer).
1) Evasion: Our multi-process approach allows to evade
this feature. By using multiple coordinated processes to en-
crypt user files, each individual process only needs to access
a subset of all user files. By varying the number of ransomware
processes used, we can limit how many file operations each
individual ransomware process performs.
G. Temp Files
Some ransomware families use temporary files as buffer
to encrypt files before overwriting them, or as a temporary
data storage while copying or removing the original files [5].
While several benign programs also generate temporary files,
this behavior can be useful when used together with other
indicators to detect the presence of ransomware [5].
1) Evasion: Ransomware does not necessarily need to use
temporary files to encrypt user data. Therefore, the most ob-
vious and effective way of evading this feature is not creating
temporary files. Regardless, our multi-process technique can
be applied to keep the number of .tmp files generated by each
individual process in line with the average number of .tmp
files used by benign applications.
H. File Type Coverage
For the purpose of ransomware, not all files are equally
important. Some file types are far more likely to contain
important data for the victim than others (e.g., a docx file vs
a cfg). Ransomware strive to access and encrypt all files with
relevant extensions [4], such as all docx files in a directory
tree, in order to maximize damage. On the other hand, benign
programs typically only access a fraction of these files.
1) Evasion: While it can be tricky for traditional ran-
somware to evade this feature, it is fairly straightforward
when using our proposed approach. A natural consequence of
distributing ransomware over multiple processes is that each
individual process accesses only a fraction of the total user
files. To evade the file type coverage feature, it is sufficient
to make sure that each ransomware process only accesses and
encrypts a portion of all the files of a given type.
I. File Similarity
Encrypting a file completely changes its content, since the
original data is overwritten with pseudorandom data. Typical
benign processes rarely alter a file in a way that its content
is overall completely different from the previous version. On
the other hand, ransomware always completely change the
whole content of a file when encrypting it. Therefore, overall
file similarity before and after write operations from a given
process is a strong feature to detect ransomware operation [21].
1) Evasion: Traditional ransomware always changes the
whole file, either by encrypting it or by performing a secure
delete operation. Therefore, there does not appear to be a sim-
ple way to avoid file similarity feature. However, our approach
can evade this feature with a technique like that proposed for
the file overwrite feature. By having each ransomware process
encrypt only a portion of any given user file, we preserve the
overall file similarity after each individual write operation, and
no individual process changes the whole file content.
J. File-Type Change
Files are structured data, and most file types are character-
ized by some magic bytes [24] within the file content. When
a file is fully encrypted, the magic bytes are also altered,
effectively changing the file type signature. Benign program
operations do not generally alter file types. On the other hand,
ransomware operation always do. Therefore, file type change
can be a useful feature to detect ransomware operation.
1) Evasion: The file type change feature can be easily
evaded, even by traditional ransomware. Indeed, it is enough
for the ransomware to preserve the original magic bytes of the
file. Even if more complex file-type techniques are used, such
as looking for changes in the overall structure of a given file,
a ransomware can still evade this feature by maintaining the
overall file structure during encryption with techniques such
as format-preserving encryption [25].
K. Access Frequency
In order to maximize the damage to the victim and minimize
the time window to intervene and stop the attack, ransomware
aims to encrypt user files as quickly as possible. To do so, a
typical ransomware performs write operations on different files
in short time windows. Some ransomware classifiers therefore
use the write access frequency of a process as a feature to
differentiate between benign and malicious processes [19].
1) Evasion: Our analysis indicates that even benign pro-
cesses often exhibit high file-write access frequency. Analyz-
ing the ShieldFS process dataset [4], we found that it is not
uncommon for benign processes to perform write operations
to different files in short time intervals, making this feature
rather weak for ransomware classification. Moreover, using
our multi-process approach allows to decrease the ransomware
access frequency to be in line with that of any benign
processes, while maintaining a high file encryption throughput
due to parallelization.
L. Other Features
This section covered what we found to be the most used and
robust features employed by current ransomware classifiers.
Other features were proposed in the literature to improve
detection accuracy. However, we found that these are either
very weak (e.g., file size change [5]), or extremely similar
to other features that we already discussed (e.g., file type
funneling [21]). Therefore, evasion is either not necessary or
achieved in a similar way to what discussed.
6
DL Directory listing operation
RD Read operation
WT Write operation
RN Rename operation
OP Open operation
CL Close operation
FRD Fast read operation
FWT Fast write operation
FOP Fast open operation
FCL Fast close operation
{X,Y} Functional group of processes performing op. X and Y
TABLE I: Notation
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the implementation of Cerberus, our
ransomware prototype implementing the mimicry evasion
technique, as well as our re-implementation of the ShieldFS
classifier.
A. The Cerberus Prototype
Splitting ransomware functionality over independent pro-
cesses requires coordination. Ensuring that each ransomware
process only expresses features typical of a benign process
further complicates the implementation.
Here, we briefly describe Cerberus, a new ransomware
prototype developed to demonstrate the feasibility of our eva-
sion techniques. The Cerberus prototype implements both the
functional splitting and mimicry attacks. Functional splitting
separates ransomware functions in different functional groups:
a process in any given group performs only the specific
ransomware functions assigned to that group. For instance,
ransomware processes in to the read-write functional group
only perform read and write operations. Cerberus implements
functional splitting by separating ransomware operations in
three groups: (1) directory list, (2) write and (3) read-rename.
Read and rename are performed in the same functional group
mainly for implementation convenience. Note that separating
read and write does not require additional open operations,
as Cerberus uses the Windows API DuplicateHandle()
to share handles to opened file between collaborating ran-
somware processes. We could have considered additional
features for the implementation of functional splitting, as
discussed in Section IV. However, since the goal of Cerberus
is merely to prove the feasibility of our evasion techniques,
we considered only the most important features exhibited by
every ransomware family. Section VI-C shows that the features
considered are enough to evade even commercial ransomware
detectors in a black-box settings.
To implement the mimicry attack in Cerberus, we performed
a statistical analysis on the behavior of benign processes from
the ShieldFS dataset, which contains traces from 2245 unique
benign applications collected over a month. Table II shows
that we can identify a few behavioral classes that represent
most benign processes in the dataset. For our implementation,
we chose the 2nd and 3rd most represented classes: directory
listing-read and read-write-rename. We chose these because
they are highly represented in the dataset of benign processes,
as well as because no ransomware process belongs to any of
DL RD WT RN % of Processes
X X X X 19.07
X X - - 18.37
- X X X 16.35
- X - - 11.44
X X X - 7.60
- X - X 6.85
- - - X 6.21
- X X - 5.61
X - - - 3.55
- - X X 2.18
X X - X 1.76
- - X - 0.42
X - - X 0.38
X - X - 0.13
X - X X 0.08
TABLE II: Behavioral profiles exhibited by benign processes
and their presence in the dataset.
these two classes (all the 383 real ransomware in our dataset
exhibits directory listing, read, write and rename operations
together). Within each class, we strive to maintain the same
ratio between operations as exhibited by benign processes. To
achieve this, we introduce dummy operations, such as null
reads or empty writes, to maintain the exact operation ratio of
benign processes.
B. Ransomware Interprocess Communication
In order to orchestrate individual processes and achieve the
ransomware’s goal, it is necessary to coordinate them properly,
which requires some form of inter-process communication.
For instance, writer processes need to know the original
content of the file to encrypt, which is provided by reader
processes. However, standard inter-process communication
mechanisms such as pipes generate additional I/O Request
Packets (IRP) [26], which are used by current state-of-the-
art detectors to calculate features. Therefore, using standard
inter-process communication would skew the behavior of
the mimicry ransomware processes, potentially making them
easier to detect. The Cerberus prototype implements a stealthy
communication technique based on direct memory access,
which allows us to avoid generating additional IRP traces for
process communication. In particular, we leverage a feature
of the Windows API that allows processes belonging to the
same user to read/write directly to each other’s address space,
without the need for any special permissions or memory
sharing. This is possible since all ransomware processes are
started by the same user. The only requirement is for the
ransomware processes to know the address range from the
address space of the process they wish to read/write to, which
in our case is passed as an argument during process creation.
This is mostly for implementation convenience, as we could
easily use more sophisticated covert channel techniques to
share the memory address in a stealthy manner.
It should be noted that an improved detector could, for
instance, use lower level system call hooks to intercept direct
memory communication. However, there are many alternative
approaches ransomware processes can employ to communicate
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in a stealth manner, from lower level kernel functions to
covert channel techniques. Even ignoring covert channels
and assuming a detector can monitor all possible types of
process communication, how to do so without introducing
undue overhead is not straightforward. Given that Cerberus is
merely an experimental prototype, we did not implement more
complex forms of stealth communication. We further discuss
the issue in Section VII.
C. ShieldFS
As we could not obtain the original code or a prototype
for ShieldFS due to patenting issues, we re-implemented the
ShieldFS classifier exactly as described, interacting with the
ShieldFS’s authors to clarify any potential misunderstanding.
We split the ShiedFS dataset in training and testing set
following a 10 : 1 ratio and trained each of the ShieldFS
model’s tiers with the appropriate feature vectors from benign
and ransomware traces. As in the original paper, we trained
multiple classifiers for each of the 28 tiers, covering percentage
of file accessed from 0.1% up to 100%. Each classifier is
implemented as a random forest of 100 trees. We validated our
implementation on the training set and obtained results in line
with the original classifier. More specifically we performed a
one-machine-off cross validation, as done in the original paper,
where benign data from one machine is selectively removed
from the training set and used for the testing. The average
accuracy of our classifier came out at 98.6%, which is slightly
higher that the 97.7% overall performance reported in [4].
VI. EVALUATION
This section presents the experimental evaluation of our
evasion techniques. In particular, we aim at answering the
following research questions: (1) is our theoretical attack
technique effective in avoiding detection? In Section VI-B,
we apply our techniques to traces generated executing tradi-
tional ransomware, and show that process splitting, functional
splitting and mimicry effectively avoid detection; (2) can our
theoretical attack evade detection when implemented in a real-
world setting? In Section VI-C we evaluate our prototype
Cerberus in a virtual machine, showing that our theoretical
attacks can be implemented and are effective in the real world;
(3) do our evasion techniques generalize, evading classifiers
trained on different datasets? In Section VI-C we show that
the mimicry attack, modeled on the ShieldFS dataset and
implemented in Cerberus, successfully evades detection of
RWGuard, which is trained on a different dataset; (4) is our
attack effective in a black-box setting against commercial
behavioral ransomware detectors? Section VI-D shows that
Cerberus successfully evades detection of [anonymized], a
leading commercial behavioral ransomware detection tool.
A. Dataset and Experimental Setup
Our trace-based evaluation leverages a dataset provided to
us by the authors of ShieldFS. Table III summarizes this
dataset; further details can be found in [4]. To train our
classifiers, we divided the data on benign processes from the
Type Benign Ransomware
#Unique Applications 2245 383
#Applications Training Set 2074 341
#Applications Testing Set 171 42
#IRPs [Millions] 1763 663.6
TABLE III: Dataset details
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Fig. 3: Evaluation of process splitting against ShieldFS
11 machines comprising the dataset into: 10 machines for the
training set and one for the testing set. For the 383 ransomware
samples, which include different ransomware families, we use
341 for training and 42 for testing.
In order to test our Cerberus prototype, we created a realistic
virtual machine-based testbed, consisting of a VirtualBox-
based Windows-10 VM. We based the VM user directory
structure and file types on the disk image of an actual office
user. File contents were extracted from our own machines and
replicated as needed. In total, our VM is comprised of 33625
files for a total of ∼ 10GB, distributed over 150 folders.
B. Trace-Based Evaluation
This section presents the trace-based evaluation of pro-
cess splitting, functional splitting and mimicry attacks. This
evaluation uses the I/O Request Packets (IRP) traces [26]
of real ransomware from the ShieldFS dataset. The testing
dataset contains 42 unique ransomware samples, which include
different ransomware families. For each ransomware, the IRP
trace contains the complete list of I/O operations performed by
the ransomware process. Both ShieldFS and RWGuard extract
the ransomware features used for detection, such as number
of read/write operations, directly from the IRP Traces. In this
section, our evaluation is based on the ShieldFS dataset [4].
Our evaluation simulates multiple processes by splitting the
IRP trace of a single ransomware in multiple traces, based on
the specific evasion technique under evaluation. Successively,
we compute the feature vector for each individual trace as if
it were an individual ransomware process. Finally, we query
the classifier and compute the percentage of feature vectors
classified as belonging to a ransomware. Table I introduces
the notations that we will use in the remainder of this section.
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1) ShieldFS
This section evaluates the effectiveness of our techniques
against the ShieldFS ransomware detector.
- Process Splitting: As mentioned in Section III-A, pro-
cess splitting evenly splits the operations performed by a
ransomware process over N processes. In a process-split
ransomware, all processes exhibit almost identical behavior
and characteristics. We begin our evaluation by splitting the
original ransomware trace in multiple traces, querying the
classifier in each trace. We increase the number of traces until
complete evasion is achieved. We evaluate process splitting
with 42 unique ransomware traces, which include different
ransomware families. We compute the feature vector for each
process-split ransomware, query the classifier and compute the
percentage of feature vectors flagged as malicious. Figure 3
illustrates our results. We can see that ShieldFS accuracy
decreases already after a single split, going from single-process
98.6% accuracy down to 65.5% on a two-process ransomware.
Further splitting incurs diminishing returns: going from two
to ten processes results in 20.1% accuracy (45.4% decrease),
and going from ten to one hundred processes results in
16.69% accuracy (3.41% decrease). Completely evading the
ShieldFS classifier requires approximately 11000 processes.
The requirement of such a large number of processes to
achieve full evasion is a clear drawback of this simplistic
approach. It is reasonable to imagine a countermeasure that
can detect process-split ransomware by monitoring the process
creation behavior at a system-level. Large swaths of newly
created processes that exhibit similar behavior can then be
clustered and analyzed as if they were a single process.
- Functional Splitting: As discussed in Section IV, ran-
somware exhibits several distinctive features. Functional split-
ting (see Section III-B) exploits the reliance of current behav-
ioral classifiers on the presence of most of these features to
detect ransomware. This section evaluates the effectiveness of
evasion based on the lack of expression of certain features
against ShieldFS. The ShieldFS classifier is trained on six
features: #folder listing (DL), #file reads (RD), #file write
(WT), #file rename (RN), file type coverage and write entropy.
Our evaluation focuses on the four main operations performed
by ransomware—DL, RD, WT, RN—and split ransomware
processes based on these four functional groups. Finally, we
assess how each functional split ransomware process performs
against the detector. Note that focusing only on these 4 features
makes it harder to evade the detector, since we make no
attempt to evade the remaining 2 features.
First we evaluate single functional splitting, where each
functional split process performs only one type of operation,
resulting in four functional groups (DL, RD, WT and RN
process groups). Within each functional group, we apply our
process splitting technique: starting with a single functional
split process per group, we recursively split it into multiple
processes until complete evasion is achieved. As illustrated
in Figure 4a, we are able to completely evade ShieldFS by
using 20 functional split processes, 5 for each of the four
functional groups. Note the contrast between Figure 4a and
Figure 3. With single functional splitting, 4 processes (one
for each functional group) are enough to drop the detector
accuracy down to ∼ 2.5%, compared to the ∼ 7500 processes
required with process splitting.
The effectiveness of functional splitting can be explained
by analyzing the dataset. There is a significant difference in
behavior, in terms of types of operations performed, between
benign and ransomware processes over their lifetime. All of
the ransomware processes in the dataset perform DL, RD,
WT and RN types of operations, while only approximately
19% of benign processes have a similar behavior. Since the
feature expression profile between traditional and functional
split ransomware is so different, with the latter being closer to
benign processes than traditional ransomware, the accuracy of
the classifier is heavily affected. To validate this hypothesis,
we further study how different functional groups affect the
performance of the detector. In particular, using combined
functional groups (i.e. processes performing RD and WT, or
DL and RN), rather than single functional groups, should result
in higher detection accuracy as the behavioral profile of the
functional split ransomware gets closer to that of a traditional
ransomware. Figure 4b illustrates our results. This experiment
evaluates the accuracy of ShieldFS considering two different
implementations of functional split ransomware. In the first
implementation, the operations are divided into the two func-
tional groups {DL,RD},{WT,RN}, while in the second imple-
mentation the two functional groups are {DL,RN},{RD,WT}.
Figure 4b shows that the initial accuracy of the classifier is
much higher when compared to single functional splitting,
hovering around 80% for {DL,RN},{RD,WT} and around
70% for {DL,RD},{WT,RN}. However, the accuracy quickly
drops as we apply process splitting within each functional
group, reaching ∼ 0% at 20 processes (10 for each functional
group). The high initial detection accuracy for Figure 4b is
due to the fact that in the first ransomware implementation
we have the {RD,WT} functional group and in the second
implementation we have the {WT,RN} functional group.
Both these functional groups are always present in traditional
ransomware, therefore the model is more likely to classify
processes that heavily exhibit these features as malicious.
Indeed, we can see that after process splitting is applied in each
functional group—and therefore the number of operations per
functional split ransomware process decreases—the accuracy
for both functional splitting implementations quickly falls
towards zero.
- Mimicry: Functional splitting evades detection by preventing
the expression of one or more features from ransomware
processes. Mimicry takes this concept one step further: rather
than completely removing a feature, we model ransomware
features so that, on average, they are identical to those of
benign processes. We build our model of a typical benign
process by performing an in-depth statistical analysis on the
behavior of benign processes in the ShieldFS dataset [4],
which comprises observations of well above one month of data
from 2245 unique benign applications and ∼ 1.7 billion IRPs.
We compute the average value for the main features used to
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Fig. 4: Evaluation of the functional splitting evasion technique against ShieldFS.
profile ransomware and we extract the ratios between different
types of I/O operations performed by benign processes. Fi-
nally, we split the ransomware activity into multiple processes,
based on average feature values and ratios. We evaluate our
approach on the ShieldFS ransomware traces that are part of
our testing set.
We focus on modeling the four main operations performed
by ransomware and benign processes—DL, RD, WT, RN—
together with the number of file accessed. Note that we could
easily consider more features in our modeling, up to all
features described in Section IV. However, since the goal of
this evaluation is to prove the effectiveness of our techniques,
it is sufficient to consider the most representative features.
Table II shows the different behavioral profiles exhibited by
benign process, along with how represented that behavior is in
the dataset. As can be seen, the most represented functional
group of benign processes exhibits all four main operations
{DL,RD,WT,RN}, with the functional groups {DL,RD} and
{RD,WT,RN} being a close second and third. On the other
hand, if we consider the behavioral profile of ransomware
processes, all 383 ransomware samples perform all four main
operations. Given that the first three process behavior groups
in Table II are all highly represented, any of them would
be a suitable target for mimicry. For this evaluation, we
decided to use the {DL,RD,WT,RN} functional group. While
this functional group is also representative of most benign
processes, the average number and ratio of operations is
completely different when compared to ransomware. This
functional group seems to be the worst-case scenario for our
mimicry evasion technique. As illustrated in Table IV, for
benign processes in the {DL,RD,WT,RN} group, the ratio
between operations is 1:16:13:1. This means that for each
DL operation, there are 16 RD, 13 WT and 1 RN operations
respectively. Moreover, processes in this functional group
access on average about 0.83% of the total number of user
files in the system. We split our ransomware traces in the test
set by following these averages and ratios, resulting in 170
mimicry ransomware processes, and successively query the
classifier with each of them. We replicate this experiment for
each of the 42 ransomware sample in our test set. None of the
mimicry processes for any of the 42 ransomware are detected
by the ShieldFS classifier.
- Discussion: It is worth noting the huge improvement gained
with mimicry with respect to process splitting. In both mimicry
and process splitting, each process performs all ransomware
operations and therefore exhibits all the features used by
ShieldFS for classification. However, with 170 process-split
ransomware the detection rate of ShieldFS is about 14%,
while with mimicry we are able to fully evade the detector.
In comparison, process splitting needs almost two orders of
magnitude more processes to achieve full evasion (11000).
2) RWGuard
This section evaluates the effectiveness of our techniques
against the RWGuard ransomware detector.
- Process Splitting: We implement process splitting as in the
evaluation against ShieldFS. As illustrated in Figure 5, the
detection accuracy for RWGuard follows a curve similar to
that of ShieldFS: the accuracy of the classifier initially remains
stable around the original 99.4%, until a critical point, after
which it quickly decreases to ∼ 10%. Afterwards, both curves
exhibit a long tail, with the detection accuracy very slowly
decreasing to zero after 400 processes for RWGuard.
- Functional Splitting: The RWGuard detector uses eight
features to classify benign and malicious processes: RD, WT,
OP, CL, FRD, FWT, FOP and FCL. In this evaluation, we
split the ransomware traces based on all eight features, and
assess how each functional split ransomware process performs
against the detector. We begin the evaluation with single func-
tional splitting, where each functional split process performs
only one type of operation, resulting in eight functional groups
(one for each feature). Within each functional group, we apply
process splitting until complete evasion is achieved. As shown
in Figure 6a, to fully evade the RWGuard classifier we need
64 functional split processes – 8 for each functional group.
We further study how different functional groupings affect
the accuracy of RWGuard. In particular, we evaluate the
accuracy of RWGuard against two different implementations
of functional split. In the first, the operations are divided into
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Fig. 5: Evaluation of process splitting against RWGuard
the two functional groups {OP,WT},{RD,CL}. For the second
implementation, we use the {RD,WT},{OP,CL} functional
groups. For the purpose of grouping, we make no distinc-
tion between normal and fast operations in this experiment.
As shown in Figure 6b and consistently with our ShieldFS
evaluation (Figure 4b), we see that the initial accuracy for
{RD,WT},{OP,CL} is much higher than in the single func-
tional splitting case, starting at approximately 95% for two
processes (one per functional group). This behavior is to be
expected since RD and WT, two of the features with the
highest importance for both detectors, are performed in the
same functional group. Indeed, when we split these operations
in two separate functional groups the accuracy of RWGuard
is much lower, starting at ∼ 4% with only 2 processes
({OP,WT},{RD,CL} in Figure 6b).
- Mimicry: We evaluate our mimicry approach against the
RWGuard classifier. As for the ShieldFS evaluation, we model
ransomware features so they are, on average, identical to
those of benign processes. In particular, we model the main
features used by RWGuard: RD, WT, OP, CL, FRD, FWT,
FOP and FCL. We split the ransomware traces in the test set
by following the average operation number and operation ratio
performed by benign processes, which resulted in 10 mimicry
ransomware processes, and queried the classifier with each
individual split trace. None of the 42 ransomware samples in
our test set were detected by RWGuard.
C. Cerberus Evaluation
This section evaluates Cerberus, our ransomware proto-
type implementing functional splitting and mimicry evasion.
Section VI-B showed that our evasion techniques are ef-
fective when applied on the traces generated by traditional
ransomware. However, it is still necessary to demonstrate that
a prototype implementation of our techniques would work
in practice. Moreover, in Section VI-B we modeled mimicry
processes based on the benign processes of the dataset used
for the training of ShieldFS and RWGuard. It is necessary to
determine whether our techniques can generalize to the case
where the benign process model is derived from a surrogate
Combination DL RD WT RN RDEntropy
WT
Entropy
File
Access
RD,RN 0 2 0 1 0.53 0 0.02%
WT 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0.60%
DL,RD,WT,RN 1 16 13 1 0.59 0.46 0.83%
RD 0 1 0 0 0.46 0 0.03%
WT,RN 0 0 5 1 0 0.47 0.02%
RD,WT 0 5 1 0 0.29 0.57 1.33%
DL,RD,RN 8 39 0 1 0.42 0 0.09%
DL,WT 2 0 1 0 0 0.51 0.01%
RD,WT,RN 0 6 20 1 0.53 0.28 0.22%
DL,RD,WT 3 52 1 0 0.57 0.77 0.17%
DL 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
DL,RD 1 2 0 0 0.52 0 0.17%
DL,WT,RN 1 0 8 2 0 0.39 0.03%
DL,RN 45 0 0 1 0 0 0.06%
RN 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.03%
TABLE IV: Ratio between different operations for various
types of benign processes.
dataset (i.e. a dataset different from the one used to train the
classifier).
1) ShieldFS
We evaluate Cerberus against ShieldFS in our virtual machine,
both in the functional split and mimicry modes. Cerberus
implements functional splitting with the following three func-
tional groups: {DL},{WT},{RD,RN}. Reading and renaming
operations are performed by the same process group mainly
for implementation convenience. It is worth noting that aggre-
gating these two features makes it easier for the classifier to
detect the ransomware. By setting Cerberus to use 6 processes
per functional group (18 processes total, which is the closest
to the 20 processes suggested by our trace-based evaluation),
we were able to fully evade the detector: no functional split
process was flagged as ransomware.
We also evaluate Cerberus in mimicry mode against
ShieldFS. We described the details of the mimicry implemen-
tation in Cerberus in Section V-A. The number of processes
in mimicry mode depends on the average number of files
accessed by the mimicked benign process group in our dataset.
Table IV shows that {DL,RD} processes access on average
∼ 0.17% of the total files, while {RD,WT,RN} processes
access ∼ 0.22%. In our VM, this results in a Cerberus run
with 470 mimicry processes, which were all able to evade
the ShieldFS detector, fully encrypting the VM files. This
evaluation proves that our attacks are practical and applicable
in realistic settings.
2) RWGuard
We further evaluate Cerberus against RWGuard in our virtual
machine, both in the functional split and mimicry modes. An
important difference compared to the RWGuard evaluation in
Section VI-B is that functional splitting in Cerberus consid-
ers only three functional group, that is: {DL}, {WT} and
{RD,RN}. Cerberus does not split RWGuard-specific features
(i.e., OP, CL, FOP, FCL, FRD, FWT). Regardless of this fact,
we are able to fully evade RWGuard with Cerberus set to use
18 functional split processes in total (6 per functional group),
as in the ShieldFS case.
We also evaluate the mimicry mode of Cerberus against RW-
Guard. For this evaluation, Cerberus is trained with the model
of benign processes obtained from the ShieldFS dataset, while
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Fig. 6: Evaluation of the functional splitting evasion technique against RWGuard.
the RWGuard model is trained on the original dataset used by
the authors in [5]. As before, in our VM evaluation Cerberus
runs with 470 mimicry ransomware processes, which are all
able to fully evade the RWGuard detector, fully encrypting the
VM files. This evaluation shows that our evasion techniques
can generalize to classifiers trained on different datasets.
D. Evaluation against a commercial detector
In previous experiments, the features used by the detectors
(ShieldFS and RWGuard) were known. However, in a real
attack scenario this white-box setting assumption might not
hold true. The last part of our experimental evaluation focuses
on black-box settings where details of the detectors are not
known. In particular, we pitch Cerberus against a leading com-
mercial ransomware detector: [anonymized] . [anonymized]
leverages machine learning techniques to detect the presence
of ransomware in the system. We have no knowledge of
the internal workings of the [anonymized] classifier, such as
which features it uses for classification, nor of its dataset. This
makes [anonymized] an ideal detector to test the viability of
our evasion techniques in a black-box setting. We evaluate
Cerberus against [anonymized] in both the functional split
and mimicry modes. For the functional splitting approach,
we continue to set Cerberus to use a total of 18 functional
split processes (6 per functional group). All 18 functional split
processes successfully evade [anonymized], fully encrypting
the VM files.
We also evaluate Cerberus running in mimicry mode against
[anonymized] . As usual, the mimicry behavior of Cerberus
processes is modeled based on the ShieldFS benign pro-
cess dataset. Therefore, Cerberus runs with the usual 470
mimicry ransomware processes, which all successfully evade
[anonymized] and fully encrypt the VM files. This last
experiment shows that our evasion techniques are general, are
effective on commercial detectors and work in a black-box
setting where we have no information on the classifier.
VII. DISCUSSION
a) Countermeasures: It is in principle possible to dy-
namically track process-to-process communication to identify
clusters of cooperating processes. A detector may then com-
pute behavioral features over the cluster of processes. This is
however challenging, since processes can communicate—both
for legitimate and malicious reasons—in a variety of manners
which must all be tracked (e.g., OS pipes, shared memory, file
system). Tracking process-to-process communication reliably
and without generating undue overhead is not straightfor-
ward. Moreover, this complexity is further exacerbated by
the possibility of using covert channel techniques, rather than
standard inter-process communication functions. Devising a
way to reliably identify a set of communicating processes is
an interesting direction for future work.
Another approach entails identifying synchronized process
behavior across applications running concurrently in differ-
ent machines. This approach leverages the insight that a
ransomware infection typically involves an entire network.
Similar approaches, although based on network traffic, have
proven effective for botnet nodes detection [27]. We note that
both the functional splitting and mimicry attack can, by design,
split operations in arbitrarily different ways. This enables
randomizing the attack behavior across different machines.
Finally, many defenses against adversarial attacks—both
theoretical and practical—have been proposed (e.g., [28],
[29]). We posit that the current generation of behavioral
malware detectors exhibits feature vulnerability [18], i.e., it
is possible to generate malicious behavior that looks, feature-
wise, exactly like benign behavior. This suggests that increas-
ing the sophistication of the classifier without rethinking the
features, may not suffice to remediate such attacks.
b) Generalization: While we concretize our attack in the
context of ransomware, we believe the underlying principle
has general applicability. Behavioral malware detectors tend
to leverage system calls or their effect (e.g., IRPs in Win-
dows) issued by individual processes in the course of their
functioning. Detection algorithms look at sequence of calls
(e.g., RNN-based approaches [30]), call frequency/count [4],
[5], [19], or more complex inter-call data dependencies [31].
In principle, any of the approaches above can be fooled
by partitioning system calls across different processes, thus
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avoiding generation of sequences with the expected proper-
ties. A complication is that calls may depend on previously
established process state; e.g. a file can only be read if it
has previously been opened by the same process. However,
many types of state can be communicated across processes
(e.g., using DuplicateHandle() in Windows). Therefore,
attackers have significant freedom in partitioning control flow
of malicious programs across processes.
VIII. RELATED WORK
a) Ransomware detection: For a review of behavioral
ransomware detection techniques [4], [5], [19]–[21], the reader
is referred to Section II-B. Other proposals focus specifically
on randomness of written data to identify encrypted content.
Data-aware Defense [32] performs the χ2-test on a sliding
window of write operations. Mbol et al. [33] use a test based
on the Kullback-Liebler divergence to detect ransomware
converting high-entropy JPEG files to encrypted content. De-
pending exclusively on randomness is dangerous for reasons
pointed out in Section IV-A. An orthogonal line of work
proposes the use of decoy files for ransomware detection [34]–
[36]. Such defenses are outside the scope of our work. We
believe decoys are a promising strategy, but they raise usability
concerns, and their evasion has been poorly studied.
b) Multiprocessing in existing malware: Several existing
ransomware families use multi-processing. This happens for
example in WannaCry. Encryption is still performed by one
process, while the others perform non encryption-related aux-
iliary tasks [37]. Petya/NotPetya works in a similar way [38].
The CERBER ransomware (not to be confused with our
Cerberus prototype), despite its name, does not appear to
perform multi-process encryption. While it has been claimed
that CERBER attempts to evade machine learning, these
claims refer to obfuscation of static payload features [39].
c) Evasion of ransomware detectors: The work closest
in spirit to ours is the critical analysis of ransomware defenses
by Genc¸ et al. [40]. For what concerns behavioral detection,
their work is more limited in scope than ours and consider a
smaller set of features. Furthermore, the work by Genc¸ et al
does not incorporate the notion of mimicry and only focus on
simple feature obfuscation (e.g., avoid changing file types).
d) Adversarial machine learning: There is a line of work
in adversarial machine learning that focuses on generating
adversarial samples for various classes of malicious programs.
In the mobile malware domain, Grosse et al. [17] generate
malicious Android app packages which go undetected by a
custom neural network classifier which uses manifest-derived
features. This attack uses Papernot’s method [11] to guide
mutations to app manifests.
Other attacks are not specifically focused on mobile. An-
derson et al. [41] propose the use of reinforcement learning
to guide mutations to malicious executables to make them
undetectable. Rosenberg et al. [42] generate adversarial mal-
ware binaries by altering various static features using a custom
mimicry attack. Hu and Tan [43] propose the use of generative
adversarial networks (GANs) to mutate feature vectors derived
from the presence/absence of imported DLLs and API calls
in a malware binary. [43] does not propose a method to
concretely generate malware binaries, only feature vectors.
Finally, several works propose attacks which mutate the
static structure of PDF-based exploits to prevent their detec-
tion [13], [14], [44], [45].
All the works above focus on static features, i.e., they alter
the appearance of a malicious file object, but not its run-time
behavior.
There is limited work on attacking dynamic (behavioral)
features—i.e., features generated by actions performed by a
process at run-time. Arguably, such features are harder to
attack; indeed, they represent actions that a malware needs
to execute in order to achieve its malicious goals.
Rosemberg et al. [42], [46] and Hu and Tan [47] proposed
methods to defeat malware detectors trained on dynamically-
generated sequences of API calls. These proposals work by
perturbing the sequence of API calls, chiefly by inserting
dummy calls.
While we use dummy calls as part of our mimicry attack, we
also leverage a broader set of capabilities such as distributing
calls across processes to reduce feature expression. This give
our technique the ability to decrease per-process frequen-
cies/counts of certain calls without slowing down the attack
(necessary to defeat the detectors in our evaluation), or to
obfuscate data dependencies between calls (such dependencies
are used by some detectors, e.g. [31]).
IX. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our work is motivated by the interest in understanding the
limitations of the current generation of malware detectors. We
believe that doing so is necessary to ensure that detection
algorithms evolve and remain effective against the constantly-
shifting threat landscape. We do not plan to publicly release
our ransomware prototype (Section V-A), in order to prevent
its use in threat development. However, we do plan to make it
available on a case-by-case basis to reputable research groups.
Furthermore, prior to submitting this paper we communicated
details and results of our attack to [anonymized].
X. CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrated a novel practical attack against behavioral
malware detectors. Our attack splits malware operations across
a set of cooperating processes. This is done in such a way
that no individual process behavior is flagged as suspicious
by a behavioral process classifier, but the combined behavior
successfully accomplishes a malicious goal.
We concretely defined and implemented this concept in the
ransomware domain. We proposed three novel attacks, process
splitting, functional splitting, and mimicry. Evaluation shows
that our methods successfully evade state-of-the-art detectors
without limiting the capabilities of ransomware.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive
evaluation of this attack model in the domain of malware and
ransomware in particular. Our work individuates a significant
limitation in behavioral detection algorithms and has relevant
13
practical implications for the current generation of malware
detectors. Directions for future work include demonstrating
concrete applications to other malware domains, and devising
efficient detection algorithms that are robust to our attacks.
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